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Abstract
The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume the prox-
imity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio
channel. However, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between
the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick this last one into think-
ing that the prover is in close proximity. This attack is generally known
as a relay attack in which scope distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist
attacks are included. Distance bounding protocols represent a promis-
ing countermeasure to hinder relay attacks. Several protocols have been
proposed during the last years but vulnerabilities of major or minor rel-
evance have been identified in most of them. In 2008, Kim et al. [18]
proposed a new distance bounding protocol with the objective of being
the best in terms of security, privacy, tag computational overhead and
fault tolerance. In this paper, we analyze this protocol and we present a
passive full disclosure attack, which allows an adversary to discover the
long-term secret key of the tag. The presented attack is very relevant,
since no security objectives are met in Kim et al.’s protocol. Then, design
guidelines are introduced with the aim of facilitating protocol designers
the stimulating task of designing secure and efficient schemes against relay
attacks. Finally a new protocol, named Hitomi and inspired by [18], is
designed conforming the guidelines proposed previously.
Keywords– RFID, distance bounding protocols, relay attacks, ter-
rorist fraud attacks, full disclosure attacks.
1 Introduction
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the most promising technolo-
gies in identifying items (i.e. persons, animals or products) with high accuracy
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and it overcomes all the other relevant technologies (i.e. barcodes) [16]. While
barcodes facilitate the identification process of the brand and model of a prod-
uct, RFID tags offer the possibility to distinguish products of the same kind
(i.e. unequivocal identification of labeled items). Specifically, an RFID system
is composed of three main components: tags, readers and a back-end database.
The readers (transceivers) interrogate tags (transponders) to access the infor-
mation stored in their memory. Afterwards, they pass this acquired information
to a back-end database which employs it as a search index to allocate all the in-
formation associated with the target tag. Readers and tags use a radio channel
for communication, which is commonly assumed to be insecure. On the other
hand, readers and the back-end database have sufficient power to provide full
cryptographic security.
RFID technology present a lot of advantages and broad applicability. How-
ever, the massive adoption of this technology is delayed due to its associated
security threats [16, 21]. In this paper, we focus on relay attacks, a type of at-
tack which has been gaining attention recently. For example, Hlavac and Rosa
[15] notice how proximity cards conforming to ISO/IEC 14443 can be abused
by a relay attack exploiting the extended timeouts in the communication.
2 Related Work
Generally, a relay attack is a kind of a man-in-the-middle attack, in which
an attacker relays messages from an authentic tag to a legitimate reader. If
the attack is successful, the adversary tricks a valid reader into believing that
it is communicating with a valid tag and that this tag is within a particular
physical distance. As an alternative, the signal strength could be used as a
measure for the detection of relay attacks. Nevertheless, this approach is not
effective when the adversary is more sophisticated and transmits with much
more power than expected. Distance bounding protocols were first introduced
by Brands and Chaum [7] to preclude distance fraud and mafia fraud attacks.
The authors proposed a mechanism to infer an upper bound of the distance
between the verifier and the prover by measuring the round trip delay during a
rapid challenge-response bit exchange of n rounds. Around fifteen years later,
Hancke and Kuhn [13] proposed a distance bounding protocol in the context of
RFID technology which may be considered a seminal paper in this research area.
Later, Munilla and Peinado [22] proposed a protocol inspired by [13] in which
the success probability of an adversary to accomplish a mafia fraud attack is
reduced. However, the feasibility of this scheme is questionable since it requires
three physical states {0, 1, void}. Singelee and Preneel [26] proposed a distance
bounding protocol which uses an error correction code to facilitate the correc-
tions of errors (in noisy channels) during the rapid bit exchange. Nevertheless,
this scheme’s security and implementation cost on RFID tags is questioned
in [23]. Finally, the above mentioned protocols do not address terrorist fraud
attacks, which can be considered an extension of mafia fraud attacks. In 2007,
Tu and Piramuthu [27] addressed both terrorist and mafia fraud attacks and
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Figure 1: Distance, Mafia and Terrorist Fraud Attack
proposed an enhancement scheme. The authors used ideas previously presented
in [25] to prevent terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, Kim et al. [18] noted that Tu’s
and Piramuthu’s protocol is vulnerable to a simple active attack and proposed
a new protocol attempting to correct the defenses of all its predecessors.
Our contribution. In this paper, we analyze the protocol proposed by Kim
et al. [18], which may currently be considered the most secure and efficient dis-
tance bounding protocol in the class of protocols that include a final signature.
However, we show that their protocol presents a vulnerability which renders it
insecure to a passive attack. We need to note here that passive attacks are much
less exigent than active attacks (e.g. mafia and terrorist fraud attacks) since
the attacker only has to eavesdrop the messages transmitted on the channel. As
a consequence of the passive attack presented below, the attacker can acquire
the full long-term secret key of the tag. We also provide some guidelines for
designing secure and efficient distance bounding protocols that are resistant to
relay attacks and passive eavesdroppers. Finally, we introduce – and provide a
security and performance analysis – the Hitomi RFID distance bounding proto-
col which complies with the proposed guidelines and is suitable for constrained
devices.
3 Relay Attacks
When designing an RFID distance bounding protocol three real-time frauds
[8, 9] need to be addressed: 1) distance fraud attacks; 2) mafia fraud attacks;
3) terrorist fraud attacks (Fig. 1).
Definition 1 In distance fraud, two entities are involved: the first (the honest
reader R) is not aware of the attack performed by the second party (the fraudulent
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tag T ). The fraud enables T to convince R of a wrong statement related to its
physical distance to R.
Definition 2 In mafia fraud, three entities are involved: the two first (honest
tag T and reader R) are not aware of the attack performed by the third party
(intruder I). The fraud enables I to convince R of an assertion related to the
private key of T .
The mafia fraud was first described by Desmedt [10]. In this fraud, the intruder
is modeled as a couple {T ,R}, where T is a dishonest tag interacting with the
honest reader R and R is a dishonest reader interacting with the honest tag T .
With the help of R, R is convinced by T of an assertion related to the private
key of T . Specifically, the assertion consists on the fact that the tag T is within
a particular physical distance.
Definition 3 In terrorist fraud, three entities are involved: the first (the reader
R) is not aware of the attack performed by the two collaborating parties (the
dishonest tag T and the intruder or terrorist tag T ). The fraud enables T to
convince R of an assertion related to the private key of T .
This attack can be viewed as an extension of the mafia fraud attack. In this
fraud, the dishonest tag T collaborates with the terrorist tag T . The dishonest
tag T uses T to convince R that it lies in close proximity, while in fact it does
not. Nevertheless, the long-term secret key of T is not revealed to the terrorist
tag T .
Apart from distance bounding protocols, constrained channel, context shar-
ing, isolation, unforgeable channel, time of flight are general techniques which
offer complete or partially resistance to relay attacks. In fact, only the isolation
technique offers protection against distance, mafia and terrorist fraud attacks.
We urge the reader to consult [9] for a complete description of these techniques.
4 Terrorist Fraud Attacks
This section briefly describes a selection of distance bounding protocols that
aim to guard against terrorist fraud attacks. The reader is urged to consult
each cited reference for a detailed description of each approach.
In [9], Bussard and Bagga addressed the fraud where a malicious prover
and an intruder collaborate to cheat a verifier. A secret sharing strategy is
proposed to combat terrorist fraud attacks. More precisely, the prover picks a
random one-time key a and encrypts its private long-term key x according to
a publicly known symmetric encryption algorithm {Ea(x)}. The prover then
splits his permanent secret key into two shares by computing Z0 := a and Z1 :=
Ea(x). Apart from the distance-bounding stage, the whole scheme is completed
by a bit commitment scheme and a proof of knowledge stage based on public
cryptography. The resources (i.e. computation, storage, power consumption,
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etc.) needed to support on-chip these two stages render this approach useless
for constrained devices such as low-cost RFID tags.
Reid et al. [25] replaced asymmetric cryptography by symmetric cryptog-
raphy in order to facilitate implementation on devices with limited resources
(i.e. sensor networks, RFID tags, etc.). The prover computes a session key
{a := fx(IDA, IDB , rA, rB)}, where f denotes a keyed hash function. Finally,
the prover splits his permanent secret key into two shares by computing Z0 := a
and Z1 := a⊕ x.
Tu and Piramuthu [27] proposed a new protocol arguing that in [25] the
identities of the prover and the verifier are transmitted in clear and thus, can
be easily traced. Nevertheless, Tu and Piramuthu do not take into considera-
tion that Reid et al.’s protocol is not proposed in the context of RFID where
anonymity and untraceability is a security objective. On the other hand, they
claim – as in [18] – that the probability with which a mafia fraud attack can occur
is bounded by (7/8)n [24]. This argumentation is completely incorrect because
Tu and Piramuthu conclude this based on the fact that fx(IDA, IDB , rA, rB)
and fx(IDA, IDB , r
′
A, rB) only differ in 1/4 of the bits given that the only ar-
gument that changes is rA, while the rest remain constant. However, at least
half of the bits are changing since f is a keyed hash function (e.g. CBC-MAC
or HMAC) as suggested in [25].
Theorem 1 In Reid et al.’s protocol, the probability that a mafia fraud attack
can occur is bounded by ( 34 )
n [20].
For a detailed proof of this theorem, the reader is urged to consult [20].
Although we recommend reading the original paper, we include a sketch proof
for completeness.
Sketch Proof An adversary could slightly accelerate the clock signal provided
to the tag and transmit an anticipated challenge c′i before the reader sends its
challenge ci to the tag. In half of the times, these values fit in, that is c
′
i = ci, and
therefore the adversary will have in advance the correct answer ri to the reader.
In the other half of the cases, the adversary can transmit a guessed bit, being
correct in half of the times. So, the adversary has 3/4 probability of answering
correctly. Assuming that the success probability at each round is independent
of previous successes, the total probability of success for an adversary is (3/4)n
for n rounds.
In [18], an active attack against the Tu’s and Piramuthu’s protocol is pro-
posed. The core idea consists of the attacker toggling a bit sent by the reader
in the rapid bit exchange, while leaving the response untouched. The attacker
observes the reader’s response and derives a bit of the long term secret key.
To prevent this attack, the message tB is incorporated by Kim et al. in their
proposed scheme (Fig. 2).
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5 Kim et al.’s Distance Bounding Protocol
Kim et al. [18] proposed two authentication protocols. They proposed both a
simple as well as a more efficient variant of their protocol. For ease of exposition,
we shall only describe the simpler scheme. The reader should note that our
proposed attack is equal effective against any of these two schemes since they
are based on the same assumptions. The basic protocol (Fig. 2) is composed of
three phases:
• Preparation Phase: The RFID reader first chooses a random number
NA and transmits it to the tag. On receiving it, the tag chooses a random
number NB and computes a temporary key a := fx(CB , NB), where x
is the permanent secret key and CB is just a system-wide constant. The
tag then splits its permanent secret key x into two shares by computing
Z0 := a and Z1 := a⊕ x. Finally, the tag transmits NB to the reader.
• Rapid Bit Exchange: This phase is repeated n times, with i varying
from 1 to n, and the challenge-response delay is measured for each step.
The reader starts by choosing a random bit ci, initializing the clock to
zero and transmitting ci to the tag. The values received by the tag are
denoted by c′i. Next, the tag answers by sending r
′
i := Z
c′i
i . The values
received by the reader are denoted by ri. On receiving ri, the reader stops
the clock and stores the received answer and the delay time ∆ti.
• Final Phase: The tag computes tB := fx(c′1, ..., c′n, ID,NA, NB). On
receiving it, the reader performs an exhaustive search over its tag database
until it finds a pair (ID, x) that matches up with the received value tB .
The reader computes the values Z0 and Z1 and checks the validity of the
responses sent during the rapid bit exchange. If errors (errc+errr +errt)
are below a threshold τ , the tag is authenticated. Finally, in cases in
which reader authentication is also demanded, the reader computes tA :=
fx(NB) and sends it to the tag.
The authors argue that the security bound against mafia fraud attacks is
( 12 )
n. Regarding the terrorist fraud attacks, they evince that this is bounded by
( 12 )
v assuming that the adversary knows at least n-v bits of the long-term secret
key. Finally, the authors claim that privacy is guaranteed since no confidential
information is transmitted on the clear. However, Kim et al. are not aware that
the two versions of the protocol, as shown in Sections 6 and 7, are vulnerable
to a passive attack which compromises all the above objectives.
6 A Full Disclosure Passive Attack
In this section we present a passive attack against Kim et al.’s [18] protocol
which takes advantage of the weak protection mechanism adopted against ter-
rorist fraud attacks. The described attack is not only applicable to [18] but it
6
Reader Channel Tag
(x, ID)
? ?
Pick a random NA
-NA
Pick a random NB
a := fx(CB , NB){
Z0 := a
Z1 = a⊕ x
ff NB
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1 to n
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Clock
-c′i
ri :=
{
Z0i , if c
′
i = 0
Z1i , if c
′
i = 1
ff ri
Stop Clock
Store ri, ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
tB := fx(c
′
1, ..., c
′
n,
ID,NA, NB)
ff tB , c′1, ...., c′n
Check ID via DB
Compute Z0, Z1.
Compute errc := #{i : ci 6= c′i},
errr := #{i : ci = c′i ∧ ri 6= Zcii },
errt := #{i : ci = c′i ∧ ∆ti > tmax.
If errc + errr + errt > τ ,
then REJECT.
tA := fx(NB)
-tA
Compute and compare tA
Figure 2: Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
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is also exploitable against its two predecessors [27, 25].
Assumption 1 Our main assumption is that the random numbers generated
by a tag do not have a long bit length (i.e. 64 or 80 bits).
The above assumption has two main justifications:
• Tag Resources: Low-cost RFID tags have widespread commercial adop-
tion [5]. Such tags have severe resource constrains and support an on-
board Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) with length 16 or 32
bits (e.g. Gen-2 tags [11]).
• Protocol Description: In the original paper, the authors do not specify
the length of the variables used. However, we can deduce it from how the
messages are built: 1) The long-term secret key x and the temporary key a
have the same bit length due to the use of the bitwise operator in the com-
putation of Z0. This length is fixed to n and represents the number of bits
exchanged during the rapid bit exchange phase. Thus, we may conclude
that the PRNG function used to generate the temporary key outputs n
bits at each invocation; 2) Besides the temporary key computation, the
tag has to generate a random number (NB in the protocol description).
For that computation the use of the PRNG function seems the most con-
venient option to conform with the demanding hardware restrictions of
the tags.
From 1) and 2), we may conclude that the random number NB , gener-
ated by the tag has the same bit length as the number of bits (n in the
protocol description) transmitted during the rapid bit exchange phase.
Summarizing, if we need to implement the protocol, we can assume that
all the variables in the protocol – long-term secret key x, session key a
and random number NB – have a length of n bits.
Remark 1 In Kim et al.’s [18] protocol, the correct selection of the parameter
n – number of bits exchanged during the rapid bit exchange phase – determines
the feasibility of the protocol. Although high values of n (i.e. n = 64 or n = 80)
are more secure, they are impractical due to the scarce resources in RFID tags
[3]. So, the n’s bit length is restricted to inferior values (e.g. 32 bits).
Kim et al. proposed that the tag sends Z0i := ai or Z
1
i := ai ⊕ xi when
receiving the challenge ri = 0 or ri = 1 respectively. Knowing Z
0 and Z1 makes
it easy to calculate the value of the long-term secret key x, since Z0 ⊕ Z1 = x.
The authors argue that the use of Z0 and Z1 frustrates terrorist attacks since
dishonest tags (T ) can not transmit both values to an intruder (I). Nevertheless,
we show that a passive attacker can discover the long-term secret key x without
requiring any collaboration with T or alteration/forwarding of the messages
transmitted on the channel.
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Theorem 2 In Kim et al.’s [18] protocol, a passive attacker can derive the
long-term secret key of the tag (the prover) by eavesdropping on the channel
over multiple executions of the authentication protocol.
Proof Let us suppose that n = 1, meaning that the challenges-responses trans-
mitted during the rapid bit exchange phase have a length of 1 bit. The attacker
performs the following steps:
1. He eavesdrops one authentication session. He identifies the session by the
random number NB sent by the tag just before the start of the rapid
bit exchange phase. Then, he stores the bits {ci, ri} transmitted (on the
clear) during the rapid bit exchange phase.
2. He eavesdrops a new authentication session. If the value N∗B is equal to
the value stored in Step 1, then the attacker stores {c∗i , r∗i } and jumps to
the next step. Otherwise, he repeats this step.
3. He checks the non equality between ci and c
∗
i . If ci 6= c∗i , then xi = ri⊕r∗i
(i.e. xi = ai ⊕ (ai ⊕ xi) = (ai ⊕ xi)⊕ ai). Otherwise, Step 2 is repeated.
The generalization of the attack for an arbitrary value n is straightforward:
1. The attacker eavesdrops one authentication session. He identifies the ses-
sion by the random number NB sent by the tag just before the start of the
rapid bit exchange phase. Then, he stores the bits {ci, ri}ni=1 transmitted
(on the clear) during the rapid bit exchange phase.
2. He eavesdrops a new authentication session. If the value N∗B is equal to
the value stored in Step 1, the attacker stores {c∗i , r∗i }ni=1 and jumps to
the next step. Otherwise, he repeats this step.
3. For i = 1 to n, he compares the non-equality between ci and c
∗
i . If ci 6= c∗i ,
then xi = ri ⊕ r∗i . The attacker stops when all the bits of xi has been
disclosed; otherwise he jumps to Step 2.
Therefore, the attacker is able to disclose the tag’s long-term secret key by
eavesdropping phase several authentication sessions on the rapid bit exchange.
In the next section, we analyze the number of sessions required for a successful
disclosure of the tags’ long-term secret key. This depends on both the number
of challenge-response bits n transmitted during the rapid bit exchange phase
and the channel bit error (Bit Error Rate - BER). We should note here that
the presented attack is the most harmful attack that a tag can suffer since its
success enables compromises (i.e. on privacy, traceability) and further attacks
(i.e. mafia and terrorist fraud attacks, etc.).
7 Experimental Results
In this section, we calculate the number of sessions that need to be eavesdropped
for a successful attack. We start by considering the simple scenario in which
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there are no transmission errors in the channel. Then, we adopt a more realistic
approach and consider that transmission errors can occur both in the backward
(tag-to-reader) and in the forward channel (reader-to-tag).
7.1 Ideal Communication Channel
We could start implementing directly the attack presented in the above section.
However, this attack is not very efficient since the average number of sessions
required to see the same random number NB is 2
−n, where n is the bit length
of the variable NB . It is important to note that the efficiency of the attack can
be increased dramatically if instead of focusing on an unique random number
NB we use information from all of the eavesdropped sessions. We are actually
creating a dictionary. This dictionary stores the random number NB of each
session. The bits {ci, ri}ni=1 transmitted on the channel during the rapid bit
exchange represent the meaning of each word NB . The complete procedure
followed by the attacker is given in detail below:
1. He initializes the meaning of the words in the dictionary to the null value
(i.e. ∀ NB , dictionary[NB ] = null).
2. He eavesdrops one session of the authentication protocol. He identifies the
session by the random number NB sent by the tag:
(a) He checks if the word NB exists in the dictionary. If it is not reg-
istered, he stores the bits transmitted on the channel during the
rapid bit exchange (i.e. dictionary[NB ] = {ci, ri}ni=1). Otherwise, he
jumps to the next step.
(b) He obtains the meaning of the word NB stored in the dictionary (i.e.
dictionary[NB] = {c∗i , r∗i }ni=1).
(c) He compares the new value eavesdropped with the value stored: For
i = 1 to n, he compares the non-equality between ci and c
∗
i . If
ci 6= c∗i , then xi = ri ⊕ r∗i .
(d) He checks if all the bits of x are obtained. If that is the case, he
stops the loop. Otherwise, he updates the meaning of the word NB
with the new eavesdropped value and jumps to Step 2. The reader
should note that a list of all the values (meanings {ci, ri}ni=1) of each
word NB could be maintained but this would increase the storage
demands significatively. To increase performance, we only store the
last value at the expense of loosing some effectiveness.
We performed the above simulation for different numbers (n={8, 10, 12,...,
30}) of challenge-response bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange. In
fact, for a fixed value n, we repeat the simulation 214 times to obtain an average
value. The results are presented in Fig. 3. As shown in this figure, the number
of eavesdropped sessions increases when the number of bits transmitted during
the rapid bit exchange increases. For example, 3, 310 and 99, 526 eavesdropped
sessions are required for n = 20 and n = 30 respectively.
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Figure 3: Number of Eavesdropped Sessions (BER = 0.0)
7.2 Real Communication Channel
In this section we consider that errors can appear in the channel. More pre-
cisely, we assume that errors are possible both in the backward and the forward
channel. We assume that the errors are independent of each other and that
the error probability is constant for all bits. Therefore, the channel (forward or
backward) produces a bit error with probability q.
Remark 2 In this section we use the knowledge of the long-term secret key
for two main purposes. Firstly, we estimate the probability of success for an
adversary that follows the same approach with that in Section 7.1 (ideal com-
munication channel). Secondly, we reckon the average number of eavesdropped
sessions required by an adversary for recovering p ∗n bits of the secret key. The
parameters p and n represent the percentage of bits that are recovered correctly
and the bit length of the secret key respectively.
The adversary, who does not know the long-term secret key, should eavesdrop
a number of session greater or equal to the number obtained in the experiments
described in this section to successfully perform his attack.
We repeat the experiments described in the previous section but this time
with the introduction of errors. Due to the errors, the probability of success is
not 100%. That implies that some of the bits guessed may be incorrect. Thus,
if one or more bits of the key are incorrect, we consider this experiment (attack)
unsuccessful and only when the whole key is revealed a success is scored. Fig.
4 depicts the results of our simulations. We can observe that the probability of
success is over 80% when the Bit Error Rate (BER) is 10−3. On the contrary,
when the BER is extremely high (BER=0.015), the probability of success de-
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Figure 4: Adversary’s Success Probability
clines exponentially as we increase the number of bits transmitted during the
rapid bit exchange.
However, the above attack can be made twice as effective, by increasing the
number of sessions that need to be eavesdropped. For a particular probability of
success p, we can estimate the average number of required eavesdropped sessions
by means of the experiment explained below. In fact, the probability p can be
interpreted as the percentage of bits that coincided between the searched key
and the estimated key. The complete procedure followed by the attacker is given
in detail below:
1. He initializes the meaning of the words in the dictionary (i.e. ∀ NB ,
dictionary[NB ] = null), as well as, the list of possible keys to the null
value.
2. He eavesdrops one session of the authentication protocol. Each session is
identified by the random number NB sent by the tag.
(a) The attacker checks if the word exists in the dictionary. If it is not
registered, he stores the bits transmitted on the channel during the
rapid bit exchange (i.e. dictionary[NB] = {ci, ri}ni=1). Otherwise,
he jumps to the next step.
(b) He obtains the meaning of the word NB stored in the dictionary (i.e.
dictionary[NB] = {c∗i , r∗i }ni=1).
(c) He compares the new eavesdropped value with the value stored: For
i = 1 to n, he compares the non-equality between ci and c
∗
i . If
ci 6= c∗i , then xi = ri ⊕ r∗i .
(d) He checks if all the bits of x are already disclosed. If they are, he
stops the loop and jumps to Step 3. Otherwise, he updates the new
12
0 10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
x 105
# 
of
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
Se
ss
io
ns
 (p
 = 
1)
# of Bits − Rapid Bit Exchange
 
 
BER = 0.0300
BER = 0.0150
BER = 0.0055
BER = 0.0010
0 10 20 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
x 104
# 
of
 R
eq
ui
re
d 
Se
ss
io
ns
 (p
 = 
0.9
)
# of Bits − Rapid Bit Exchange
 
 
BER = 0.0300
BER = 0.0150
BER = 0.0055
BER = 0.0010
Figure 5: Number of Eavesdropped Sessions (p = 1 and p = 0.9)
meaning of the word with the new eavesdropped value and jumps to
Step 2.
3. Key searching:
(a) The attacker stores the new key in the list of possible keys.
(b) He derives the most common value that appears in the list of possible
keys.
(c) He compares the most common value of the key (derived from the
previous step) with the pursued key (see Remark 1). If the differences
(in bits) between these two values is lower than p∗n, the whole process
stops. Otherwise, he jumps to Step 2 again.
We perform a careful study of the number of sessions required, by following
the above experimental procedure. As previously, we perform 214 independent
trials to obtain an average value. Fig. 4-6 summarize the results obtained.
Fig. 5 depicts the number of sessions required for p = 1 and p = 0.9. By
comparing these results, we observe that the number of sessions is increased
by an order of magnitude when the percentage of recovered bits of the key is
increased from 90% to 100%. For p = 0.9, the influence of errors in the channel
is only slightly noticeable when the BER is extremely high. However, for p = 1,
the effect of the BER is marked. As expected, the number of required sessions
increases when the number of challenge-response bits transmitted during the
rapid bit exchange raises and/or the number of errors in the channel (BER)
increases.
Fig. 6 depicts the number of required eavesdropped sessions for very noisy
channels. Specifically, we show how the number of required eavesdropped ses-
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Figure 6: Number of Eavesdropped Sessions (BER = 0.03 and BER = 0.06)
sions changes as the number of bits increases for probability p (p = {0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9})
and BER values (BER = 0.03 or BER = 0.06). For a moderately high BER =
0.03, there is no significant difference between the number of sessions required
for recovering a part of the key (i.e. 60-70%) or almost the whole key (i.e. 90%).
On the contrary, this difference is evident for higher BER (i.e. 0.06 in the Fig.
6). From these figures we conclude that when the BER is low, the additional
effort required to obtain a larger percentage of the key is small.
The effect of noise becomes clearer in Fig. 7, which shows the number of
required eavesdropped sessions to fully obtain the key (p = 1), versus the num-
ber of bits in the bit exchange phase, for three different BER values (BER =
{0.03, 0.06, 0.09}). As a rule of thumb, we observe that when the BER is twice
as much as was previously simulated, the number of required session is multi-
plied at least by a factor of three. Nevertheless, even for an extremely high BER
= 0.03, the number of required eavesdropped sessions is inferior to the number
of attempts that an adversary would need to perform a brute force attack1 (i.e.
] of Required Sessions
2n < 1).
Remark 3 As we already mentioned before, the feasibility of the described at-
tack is significantly superior to that of a brute force attack. As a rule of thumb,
2
n
2 << 2n, where n represents the number of challenge-response bits transmitted
during the rapid bit exchange phase. On the other hand, we are aware of the
main drawback of this passive attack. Specifically, the attack requires the tag to
be engaged in many sessions; something that is not required for the brute force
attack.
1If the number of bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange phase is n, then the
attacker has to guess a word of n bits.
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Figure 7: Number of Eavesdropped Sessions (BER = {0.03, 0.06, 0.09})
Remark 4 In [1] a formal framework to cryptanalyse distance bounding pro-
tocols is presented. According to this proposal, our attack can be classified as
a “no-ask” strategy since the adversary does not interact at all with the prover
during the attack.
8 Design Guidelines
In this section we describe the standard procedures that protocol designers
should consider to propose a secure and efficient RFID protocol against relay
attacks. This is the first time – to the best of our knowledge – that a complete
set of guidelines is presented. Our work complements the formal framework
for cryptanalyzing distance-bounding protocols proposed by Avoine et al. [1].
Particularly, we focus on distance-bounding protocols in which the RFID reader
(prover) sends a single-bit challenge and the tag (verifier) replies with a rapid
single-bit response. The above procedure is repeated n times, where n repre-
sents a security parameter. Finally, the reader computes an upper-bound of the
distance between both entities by measuring the delay time between the chal-
lenges and responses, which is based on the fact that messages cannot propagate
faster than light. We emphasize that the tag should send its answer immediately
after receiving a challenge from the reader for the bound to be tight.
8.1 Distance Fraud Attacks
A distance fraud attack is possible when there is no relationship between the
challenge bits and the response bits exchanged during the distance verification.
If a fraudulent tag T knows when the challenge bits will be sent, it can trick
the reader R by sending the response bits before receiving the challenge bits.
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Thus, R computes a wrong upper bound regarding its physical distance to T . To
resolve this problem, we present three solutions. Of those, we mostly recommend
the third as it is the most feasible.
• Solution A: The RFID reader sends challenge bits at random chosen
times. Due to this countermeasure, T cannot send response bits before he
has received the challenge bits as T can not predict when the reader will
expect a response. Brands and Chaum [7] suggested that it is sufficient
for R to send its response randomly at one of two discrete times (i.e. each
3i or 3i+ 1 clock cycles). This strategy has a success probability of ( 12 )
n
if the selection of discrete times is random.
• Solution B: The RFID reader can use void challenges [22] to detect
that T is not waiting to receive the challenge bits. A void challenge is
a challenge which the reader intentionally leaves without sending. That
is, the challenge bits ci sent by the reader can take three different values
{0, 1, void}. If the reader detects that a response bit is received during the
interval of a void challenge, the dishonest tag T is detected. As previously,
the strategy has a success probability of ( 12 )
n. Note that the inclusion of
void challenges is equivalent to transmitting the challenge bits ci = {0, 1}
at randomly chosen times.
• Solution C: The tag T must select its response depending on the chal-
lenge sent by the reader R. A possible scheme is presented below:
– Step 1: R generates at random n bits ci.
– Step 2: T generates at random n bits mi and commits these bits
using a secure commitment scheme (i.e. commit{mi, ...,mn}).2
– Step 3: The rapid bit exchange phase can start. This phase is
repeated n times, with i varying from 1 to n, and the challenge-
response delay is measured for each step:
∗ R sends the bit ci to T and initializes the clock to zero.
∗ T sends the bit ri = ci ⊕mi immediately after he receives ci.
∗ On receiving ri, R stops the clock and stores the delay time.
– Step 4: T opens the commitment and R verifies whether {ci ⊕ ri}ni=1
equals {mi}ni=1. If so, R computes an upper bound on the distance
to T using the maximum of the measured delay times.
Similarly to solution A the success probability for an adversary is at most
( 12 )
n [7].
Theorem 3 If an RFID tag is not in close proximity to an RFID reader then,
independently of the selected strategy {A,B,C} to avoid distance frauds, the
success probability for an adversary to launch a distance fraud attack is at most
( 12 )
n [7].
2As an alternative solution, Brands and Chaum [7] suggested to create a public bit string
{mi, ...,mn}, where the choice of bits mi is irrelevant.
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8.2 Mafia Fraud Attacks
Hancke and Kuhn [13] proposed a distance bounding protocol which incorpo-
rates the use of a rapid bit exchange phase. In this protocol, the success proba-
bility with which a mafia attack can succeed is bounded by ( 34 )
n [27]. However,
this probability is superior than the optimal value ( 12 )
n. To achieve this optimal
value, as suggested in [18, 7], the tag has to sign or encrypt the bits sent back
and forth during the rapid bit exchange. A possible scheme is presented below,
where R and T denote the reader and the tag respectively.
• Step 1: R generates at random n bits ci.
• Step 2: T generates at random n bits ri.
• Step 3: The rapid bit exchange phase can start. This phase is repeated
n times, with i varying from 1 to n, and the challenge-response delay is
measured for each step:
– R sends ci to T and initializes the clock to zero.
– T sends the bit ri = ci ⊕ mi to the reader R immediately after he
receives ci.
– On receiving ri, R stops the clock and stores the received value and
the delay time.
• Step 4: T concatenates the challenges and responses to create a message
{c1||c2||...||cn||r1||r2||...||rn} of length 2n. Then, he signs or encrypts the
resulting message, and sends the result to R.
The reader R determines an upper bound on the distance to the tag us-
ing the maximum of the delay times measured. Finally, he accepts this value
once the correctness of the challenge-response bits are checked by using the last
encrypted/signed message.
Theorem 4 If the signature/encryption scheme is secure and the tag is not in
physical proximity to the reader, an adversary has a success probability upper
bounded by ( 12 )
n [18, 7].
The main drawback of using a final signature at the end of the protocol is
the fact that this message has to be sent by normal communication method with
error detection or correction technique [17]. The execution time of the whole
protocol is thus increased in comparison with protocols that omit this last mes-
sage. However, the existing alternatives (void-challenges [22], predefined chal-
lenges [17], tree-based approach [3] and multistate enhancement [2]) have other
relevant drawbacks such as excessive memory requirements and performance
problems (i.e. complex coding schemes and greater bandwidth requirements).
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8.3 Terrorist Fraud Attacks
Bussard [8, 9] suggested a mechanism through which it is impossible to mount
a successful terrorist fraud attack unless the attacker discloses the private key
in some way. Although Bussard’s scheme is correct, it can not be applied to
devices with limited resources since it relies on public key cryptography. Some
alternatives have been proposed in the context of low-cost RFID tags but all of
them are vulnerable to a full disclosure attack conducted by a passive attacker,
as shown in Sections 6 and 7. As a solution, we present two schemes that offer
protection against terrorist attacks and conform to the requirements of severely
resource constrained devices such as RFID tags. Case A assumes that tags
support an encryption function (E) [6, 14] and a Pseudo-Random Function -
PRF (f) [19]. In case B, tags only have a PRF and can compute simple bitwise
operations. These two schemes are described below; where the long-term secret
key of the tag is denoted by x:
1. Preparation Phase: The tag computes a temporary key (e.g. a =
fx(NR, NT ,W )), where NR/T denotes a random number generated by the
reader (R) / tag (T ) and W represents any additional parameter. The tag
then splits its permanent secret key x into two shares by computing:
– Case A: Z0 := a and Z1 := Ea(x).
– Case B: Z0 := a and Z1 := fa(N
′
T ,W
′)⊕ x.
N ′T denotes a random number generated by T and W
′ any extra
parameter respectively.
2. Rapid Bit Exchange: This phase is repeated n times, with i varying
from 1 to n. At every step i, we measure the challenge-response delay
time.
• Step 1: R generates a random bit ci, initializes the clock to zero
and transmits ci to T .
• Step 2: T sends the bit ri := Zcii to the reader R immediately after
he receives ci.
• Step 3: On receiving ri, R stops the clock and stores the delay time.
Theorem 5 If a secure encryption function and/or a pseudo-random function
is used, the probability with which a terrorist fraud attack can succeed is bounded
by ( 34 )
v, when n − v bits of the long-term secret key are revealed from the dis-
honest tag T to the terrorist tag T .
Proof Let us suppose that the attacker knows n − v bits of the secret key.
Additionally, we can assume the worst case scenario in which the dishonest tag
T transmits the whole n bits of Z0 or Z1 to T . In this situation and during
the rapid bit exchange, T may replay incorrectly for any of the v (from a total
of n) bits for which it has not obtained the corresponding secret key bits. For
those cases, in half of the times he receives ri = 0 and therefore T knows the
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response in advance as Z0 was completely revealed. In the other half of the
cases (ri = 1), T can send a guessed bit, being correct half of the times (in
the worst case). Thus, the adversary has 3/4 probability of answering correctly.
Finally, assuming that the success probability at each round is independent of
previous successes, the total probability of success is upper bounded by ( 34 )
v, in
case n− v bits of the secret key are revealed.
8.4 Dictionary Attack
As a consequence of splitting the key to offer protection against terrorist attacks,
a dictionary attack may be conducted by a passive attacker as presented in
Sections 6 and 7. In this attack, the adversary takes advantage of observing
multiple sessions in which the same temporary key – random numbers associated
to the current session – is used. Specifically, the feasibility of the proposed
attack is due to the bit length of the random numbers generated by the tags.
In standard cryptography, bit lengths of 64 or 80 bits are used. However, in
limited devices (i.e. low-cost RFID tags, sensor nodes, etc.), the bit length of
variables is drastically reduced due to resource constraints. Thus, the usage of
several temporary keys and random numbers of small bit length – associated to
each session – is necessary to thwart this kind of attacks.
9 The Hitomi RFID Distance Bounding Proto-
col
In this section, a new RFID distance bounding protocol is presented. The
proposed protocol follows the guidelines described in the previous section and
attempts to offer resistance to the most common attacks (i.e. distance fraud,
mafia fraud, terrorist fraud and dictionary attacks). Our proposal is not ex
nihilo, but inspired by the Swiss-Knife RFID distance bounding protocol [18].
The organization of this section is as follows. First, a description and analysis
of the protocol is presented. Then, we perform a study of the threshold/errors
defined in the final phase of the protocol. These errors are similar to those
defined in the original scheme but a rigorous analysis of these values is missing
from the original proposal.
9.1 The Protocol
The tag and the reader share a long-term secret key x and each tag has a unique
identifier ID. The tags’ capabilities support a Pseudo-Random Function - PRF
(f) and can perform bitwise operations. To avoid ambiguity, we assume that all
the variables have the same bit length which is fixed by the number of challenge-
response bits transmitted during the rapid bit exchange phase and denoted by
n. The messages exchanged in the different phases (i.e. preparation phase,
rapid bit exchange phase and final phase) of the protocol (Fig. 8) are described
below.
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Reader Channel Tag
(x, ID)
? ?
Pick a random NR
-NR
Pick a random NT1 , NT2 and NT3
a := fx(NR, NT1 ,W )
b := fa(NT2 , NT3 ,W
′){
Z0 := a
Z1 = b⊕ x
ffNT1 , NT2 , NT3
Start of rapid bit exchange
for i = 1 to n
Pick ci ∈ {0, 1}
Start Clock
-c′i
r′i :=
{
Z0i , if c
′
i = 0
Z1i , if c
′
i = 1
ff ri
Stop Clock
Store ri, ∆ti
End of rapid bit exchange
m =
{c′1||c′2||...||c′n||r′1||r′2||...||r′n}
tB := fx(m, ID,NR, NT1 ,
NT2 , NT3 )
ff tB ,m
Check ID via DB
Compute Z0, Z1, R0, R1
Compute errc := #{i : ci 6= c′i},
errr := #{i : ci = c′i ∧ ri 6= Zcii },
errt := #{i : ci = c′i ∧ ∆ti > tmax.
If errc + errr + errt > τ ,
then REJECT.
tA := fx(NR, b)
-tA
Compute and compare tA
Fig. 8. Hitomi RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
Figure 8: Hitomi RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
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• Preparation Phase: The protocol starts with a preparation phase that
involves invocations of the PRF, random number generations and the com-
putation of several bitwise operations.
– The reader chooses a random nonce NR and transmits it to the tag.
– The tag chooses three random numbers {NT1 , NT2 , NT3}. Then, it
computes the temporary keys {a, b} as described below:{
a := fx(NR, NT1 ,W )
b := fa(NT2 , NT3 ,W
′)
where W and W ′ represent any extra parameters.
Then, the tag splits its permanent secret key x into two shares by
computing: {
Z0 := a
Z1 := b⊕ x
Finally, the tag transmits {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} and {W,W ′} to the reader.
• Rapid Bit Exchange Phase: This phase is repeated for n rounds. At
the i-th round, we measure the challenge-response delay time.
– R generates a random bit ci, initializes the clock to zero and sends
ci to T . We denote by c
′
i the value received by the tag, which may
be non-equal to ci due to errors or alterations in the channel.
– T sends the bit r′i := Z
c′i
i to the reader immediately after receiving
c′i. Similarly, we denote by ri the value received by the reader.
– On receiving ri, R stops the clock and stores the delay time.
• Final Phase: The tag concatenates the challenge and response bits to
obtain m = {c′1||c′2||...||c′n||r′1||r′2||...||r′n}, where m’s length is equal to 2n
bits. Then, it computes tB by ciphering the concatenation of m, the tag
identifier ID and the random numbers involved in the preparation phase.
tB := fx(m, ID,NR, NT1 , NT2 , NT3)
Finally, the tag sends the pair {tB ,m} to the reader. The reader checks
the correctness of the values received:
– The reader performs an exhaustive search in its database until a
match between a pair {ID, x} and tB is found.
– The reader computes a local version of the temporary keys {a, b}.
– The reader checks the validity of the responses received during the
rapid bit exchange. Specifically:
∗ errc: it counts the number of times that ci 6= c′i.
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∗ errr: it counts the number of times that ci = c′i but ri 6= Zcii ⊕
Rcii .
∗ errt: it counts the number of times that ci = c′i but the response
delay ∆ti is above a defined time threshold tmax.
∗ Finally, it checks if errc + errr + errt is below a fault tolerance
threshold τ . If not, the protocol is aborted.
– In those cases in which reader authentication is demanded, a final
message is exchanged. The reader computes tA := fx(NR, b) and
transmits it to the tag. Once the tag checks its correctness, the two
entities are mutually authenticated.
The protocol provides the mutual authentication between the tag (prover)
and the reader (verifier). In fact, the Swiss-Knife and consequently the Hitomi
protocol, both inherit the security properties of the MAP1 scheme [4, 12] on
which these proposals are based. For a detail description of those security
properties the reader is urged to consult [4, 12].
In order to guarantee privacy protection, we avoid transmitting identifiers in
plain-text. More precisely, the tag transmits its identifier after the completion
of the rapid bit exchange phase. This identifier is anonymized since it is incorpo-
rated in the computation of tB which is based on the usage of the PRF and the
whole collection of nonces linked to the current session. A traceability attack
using previous protocol executions is not possible since the values transmitted
on the clear are either random numbers or the output of the PRF, which in-
cludes the above mentioned nonces as inputs. A disadvantage of this solution is
that the reader has to conduct an exhaustive search in the back-end database to
retrieve the identity of the tag. However, there is not known alterative method
that offers this level of security [18].
The Hitomi protocol, as defined, complies with the guidelines presented in
Section 8. We adopt Solution C (Section 8.1) to thwart attacker plans according
to distance fraud and attempting to optimize the performance of the proposed
scheme. Although Solutions A and B are as effective in thwarting distance fraud
attacks as Solution C, their implementation is more complicated. Furthermore,
we employ a final signature – a signed message tB containing the received and
sent challenges – to hinder mafia fraud attacks. We have not examined other
approaches such as void-challenges and predefined challenges, since we focus on
protocol simplicity and communication efficiency.
Corollary 1 Based on Theorems 3 and 4, the success probability of a mafia
and distance fraud attack against the Hitomi RFID distance bounding protocol
is upper bounded by ( 12 )
n.
The secret key x is split into two parts {Z0, Z1} to combat terrorist attacks.
Basically, the above construction represents a secret sharing strategy. Each time
the tag is interrogated (c′i) in the rapid bit exchange phase, the tag discloses
only one part of each bit (Z
c′i
i ). Thus, no information on the secret key x
is revealed through the responses bits ri. Additionally, there is a non-linear
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relation between (Z0) and (Z1) on the contrary with what happens in previous
proposals [18, 27, 25] in which xi = Z
0
i ⊕ Z1i .
Corollary 2 Due to Theorem 5 and assuming that a secure pseudo-random
function f is used, the success probability of a terrorist fraud attack against the
Hitomi RFID distance bounding protocol is upper bounded by ( 34 )
v, when n− v
bits of the long-term secret key are revealed from the dishonest tag T to the
terrorist tag T .
Remark 5 If we follow the strategy introduced in Section 6 against the Hitomi
protocol, the dictionary attack has a complexity significantly superior due to two
main reasons. Firstly, three n-bit random numbers {NT1 , NT2 , NT3} take part
in the generation of the session keys {a, b}. Secondly, the adversary has to
eavesdrop two sessions in which ci = c
∗
i ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., n}. This last condition is
due to the fact that Z0 ⊕ Z1 6= x in our proposed scheme. Summarizing, the
attacker has to eavesdrop two sessions in which four nonces have the same value
respectively. If we assume that the attacker is active, then he can choose the
challenge sent by the reader (adversary) during the rapid bit exchange phase but
he has no control over the three random numbers generated by the tag. So, the
number of sessions N – from the birthday paradox – that an adversary has to
eavesdrop to conduct a successfully dictionary attack is:
N ' 2 3n2 ·
√
2 · ln 1
1− p
where n represents the bit length of the random numbers and p is the proba-
bility of listening two sessions with the same three random numbers.
Finally, we present a performance comparison of the most well-known exist-
ing distance bounding protocols that attempt to offer resistance against both
mafia and terrorist fraud attacks. Table 1 summarizes our assessment. Firstly,
in Table 1 (A), we indicate if these protocols are vulnerable to any of these
frauds. In case they are, we give the corresponding success probability for an
adversary. That is, the probability an adversary deceives a valid reader into
believing that it is communicating with a valid tag and that this tag is within
a particular physical distance. This probability is commonly appeared in the
literature as the False Acceptance Ratio (FAR). More precisely, M-FAR and
T-FAR represent the false acceptance ratio against mafia and terrorist fraud at-
tacks respectively. The columns Mafia and Terrorist show whether the defence
against each of these attacks is an objective of the protocol.
In Table 1 (B), we first indicate what are the protocols that have a mech-
anism for handling errors (“Error resistance” column). This is an issue that
must be addressed explicitly, since the challenge-response bits transmitted in
the rapid bit exchange phase are sensitive to channel errors. Secondly, we in-
dicate whether the protocols include privacy protection measures (“Privacy”
column). It is easy to see that the majority of the proposals put the privacy
of tag holders at stake due to two main reasons: 1) tags/readers transmit in
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Table 1: Performance Comparison of distance bounding protocols
Fraud
Protocol Mafia M-FAR Terrorist T-FAR
Brands & Chaum [7] Yes ( 12 )
n No –
Hanche & Kuhn [13] Yes ( 34 )
n No –
Reid et al. [25]§ No – No –
Tu & Piramuthu [27]§ No – No –
Swiss-Knife [18]§ No – No –
Hitomi Yes ( 12 )
n Yes ( 12 )
n
Table 1 (A)
Protocol Err. resis. Privacy M. Authen. ] Op. ] Nonces
Brands & Chaum [7] No – No 2 1
Hanche & Kuhn [13] Yes – No 1 1
Reid et al. [25]§ No No 2 1
Tu & Piramuthu [27]§ Yes No No 5 1
Swiss-Knife [18]§ Yes No No 3(2†) 1
Hitomi Yes Yes Yes 6(5†) 3‡
Table 1 (B)
§ The protocol is vulnerable to a full disclosure attack which wrecks all the security
properties claimed (see Sections 6 and 7).
† Reader authentication is not a protocol requirement.
‡ This is the first protocol that considers and offers resistance to dictionary attacks.
plain-text their identities; 2) all the tags share a single secret. Thirdly, in
“Mutual Authentication” column we indicate which protocols provide mutual
authentication between the verifier (reader) and the prover (tag). Finally, we
calculate the computation overhead. More precisely, we indicate the number of
invocations – “Operations” column – of cryptographic primitives such as hash
functions, pseudo-random functions or symmetric key encryptions. Finally, we
list the required number of random numbers (nonces) for the execution of each
protocol (“Nonces” column).
9.2 The Threshold
In our protocol, we perform a rapid bit exchange composed of n challenge-
response rounds. At the end of the rapid bit exchange we count the number of
misses (errors) ε between the transmitted and received challenges and responses.
More precisely, we consider that a transmitted challenge ci might be different
from the received challenge c′i and similarly a transmitted response ri might be
different from a received response r′i. These mismatches between ci, c
′
i or ri, r
′
i
might be caused either due to noise in the communication channel or due to the
fact that the tag that tries to be authenticated is not legitimate (an adversary).
We need to tradeoff the possibility of authenticating an adversary and re-
jecting a legitimate tag due to some legitimate errors caused by the noise in the
communication channel. For this purpose, we introduce a threshold τ such that
we shall authenticate the communicating party if and only if ε < τ .
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To fully specify the problem, we assume that if we wrongly authenticate
an attacker A, then we suffer loss L = `A. On the other hand, if we reject a
legitimate tag T , then we suffer a loss L = `T . In other cases, we suffer no loss.
3
We wish to minimise the expected loss EL. The expected loss given that the
communicating party is an attacker A or the tag T , is given respectively by:
E(L|A) = Pr(ε < τ |A) · `A + Pr(ε ≥ τ |A) · 0
E(L|T ) = Pr(ε < τ |T ) · 0 + Pr(ε ≥ τ |T ) · `T .
The expected loss is in any case bounded by the maximum loss:
EL ≤ max {E(L|A),E(L|T )} . (1)
If the attacker A has an error rate that is at least pA, then we can analytically
express a bound on the probability of falsely authenticating him via the binomial
formula. However, a simpler expression is given by the following inequality,
which holds for pA > τ/n, by noting that E(ε|A) = npA:
Pr(ε < τ |A) < exp
(
−2n(pA − τ
n
)2
)
=
= exp
(
− 2
n
(npA − τ)2
)
This bound follows from the well-known Hoeffding inequality (Equation (13)
in Appendix). Similarly, we can bound the probability of falsely rejecting a tag
T with error rate pT by:
Pr(ε ≥ τ |T ) ≤ exp
(
−2n(pT − τ
n
)2
)
=
= exp
(
− 2
n
(npT − τ)2
)
for pT < τ/n.
Henceforth, we always consider the case pT < τ/n < pA. Equating the two
terms in the max operator of (1) we obtain, after some elementary manipula-
tions, a value of τ such that they are approximately equal:
τ =
2n(p2T − p2A)− log `T`A
4(pT − pA) . (2)
This can be used as a nearly optimal value for the threshold τ , given the bounds
pT , pA on the error probability of the user and attacker respectively, and the
desired losses `A, `T .
3These losses are subjectively set to application-dependent values. Clearly, for cases where
falsely authenticating an attacker the impact is severe, `A must be much greater than `T .
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9.2.1 Choice of the Threshold for Specific Protocols
In this section we calculate the values of pA and pT for Kim et al.’s (Swiss-Knife)
protocol [18]. These are also valid for the proposed protocol (Hitomi) and can
be used to select an appropriate value of the threshold τ for a given number (n)
of rapid bit exchange challenge-response rounds.
In Kim et al.’s distance bounding protocol the condition that aborts the
authentication of the prover (tag T ) is the following:
errc + errr + errt ≥ τ,
where ∀i ∈ [1, n]:
errc :=#{i : ci 6= c′i} (3)
errc :=#{i : ci = c′i ∧ ri 6= Zcii } (4)
errt :=#{i : ci = c′i ∧∆ti > tmax} (5)
The optimal strategy for the attacker cannot include delaying to send his
responses. To see this imagine that the attacker can choose to either wait in
order to obtain the correct challenge-response pair or to guess. If he does the
former then the number of errors errt increases by one always. If however he
guesses, then there is always a non-zero probability that the number of errors
will not increase. Thus, while the third error errt is useful for detecting classic
relay attacks, it cannot be part of the attacker’s strategy for any of the other
attacks. That means that if the attacker has the choice to mix the delaying
strategy with a guessing strategy, it is always better to choose the guessing
strategy. For this reason, the error errt is disregarded in the analysis.
Thus, in order to minimise the expected loss, we only need to consider the
following condition:
errc + errr ≥ τ (6)
Let us assume that ci denotes the challenge sent by the reader in the i-th
round of the rapid bit exchange phase. We denote by c′i the challenge that the
legitimate tag T received. We assume due to noise, that ci 6= c′i can occur with
probability ω ∈ [0, 1/2]. Finally, we use c′′i to denote the challenge received by
the attacker A, which may again differ from ci with probability ω.
For the attacker A, the probability of making an error ε is:
Pr(ε|A) = Pr(ε|c 6= c′) Pr(c 6= c′) + Pr(ε|c = c′) Pr(c = c′)
= 1 · 1
2
+ Pr(ε|c = c′) · 1
2
(7)
It holds that:
Pr(ε|c = c′) = Pr(c′′ = c|c = c′) Pr(ε|c′′ = c ∧ c = c′)
+ Pr(c′′ 6= c|c = c′) Pr(ε|c′′ 6= c ∧ c = c′)
=(1− ω) · ω + ω · 1
2
=
3ω
2
− w2 (8)
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Thus, equation (7) using (8) gives us:
Pr(ε|A) = 1
2
+
3ω
4
− ω
2
2
≥ ω + 1
2
(9)
assuming that ω ≤ 12 and ω 6= 0. For the legitimate tag T the probability of
making an error ε is given by:
Pr(ε|T ) =
Pr(ε|c′′ = c′) Pr(c = c′) + Pr(ε|c′′ 6= c′) Pr(c 6= c′) =
ω(1− ω) + ω = 2ω − ω2 ≤ 2ω (10)
From, equations (9) and (10) we get:
pA =
ω + 1
2
and pT = 2ω (11)
By substituting the values of pA, pT in equation (2) we get:
τ =
n(5ω + 1)
4
− logρ
6ω − 2 , (12)
where ρ = `T`A .
Fig. 9 and 10 depict how the value of the threshold τ changes as we increase
the number of bits (n) exchanged during the rapid bit exchange for various
values of the probability of noise ω (BER= {0.030, 0.015, 0.010, 0.01}). Fig. 9
depict the results when ρ = `T`A = 1, while figure 10 depict the results when
ρ = `T`A = 10. In both cases it is obvious that the threshold τ reduces as the
noise ω reduces and increases as the numbers of bits n increases. Additionally,
when the ratio ρ increases then the threshold τ also increases.
Kim et al. [18] introduced the use of a threshold τ in a distance bounding
protocol that can be used to avoid the failure of authenticating legitimate tags
considering that some legitimate errors might be caused due to the noise in the
communication channel. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time that a detailed analysis of the threshold τ is provided taking into consid-
eration the probability of having errors due to the noise in the communication
channel.
10 Conclusions
Physical location is an important security variable. Several techniques can be
employed to measure the distance between a prover and a verifier. However,
signal strength is an unreliable indicator of distance, since it can be manipu-
lated. For this reason, delay-time based measurements such as those employed
in distance bounding protocols, are more appropriate. Nevertheless, the vast
majority of these protocols focus on thwarting mafia fraud attacks. This paper
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is concerned with terrorist attacks, whose security considerations have not re-
ceived a lot of attention. In fact, none of the currently existing proposals are
completely secure against terrorist fraud attacks. In 2008, Kim et al. [18] pro-
posed a distance bounding protocol (Swiss-Knife protocol), which was claimed
to cover all security objectives expected from an RFID system. However, we
assume that Swiss-Knife protocol is vulnerable to a passive attack, which may
lead to the full disclosure of the secret key shared between the reader and the
tag. Consequently, all security objectives are compromised. Furthermore, the
described attack is also applicable to the protocols proposed by Reid et al. [25]
and Tu and Piramuthu [27], since the Swiss-Knife protocol is based on these
schemes. Additionally, we provide a set of guidelines that should be followed
by protocol designers in order to design secure and efficient distance bounding
protocols suitable for devices with constrained resources. Finally, a new pro-
tocol, named Hitomi, conforming to the proposed guidelines is presented and
analyzed from the point of view of security and performance. The existence
of more efficient protocols that can offer the same level of security is an open
problem.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding) For any sequence of random variables X1, . . . , Xn such
that Xi ∈ [ai, bi], with µi , EXi:
Pr
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥
n∑
i=1
µi + nt
)
≤ exp
(
−2 n
2t2∑n
i=1 bi − ai
)
. (13)
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